Enlarging the European Union - Where does Turkey Stand, stosunki międzynarodowe, książki, Turcja
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Introduction
The European Union is engaged in an extensive process of enlargement. The European Council decided
in its Luxembourg summit of December 1997 to open the path for the Union’s enlargement towards the
Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus, upon the European Commission’s proposal in its
Agenda 2000 of July 1997. The Helsinki summit of December 1999 included Turkey and Malta in this
process of enlargement. Currently, there are 13 candidate countries aspiring for full membership of the
EU, an analysis of these countries’ relations with the EU is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Candidate countries and the agreements they signed with the EU
Country
Association
Agreement
Operation of the
Association
Membership
application
Start of Accession
negotiations
Turkey
September 1963 December1964 14 April 1987
----
Cyprus
December 1970 April 1971
3 July 1990
31 March 1998
Malta
December 1972 June 1973
18 July 1990
15 February 2000
Hungary
December 1991 February 1994
31 March 1994
31 March 1998
Poland
December 1991 February 1994
5 April 1994
31 March 1998
Bulgaria
March 1993
February 1995
14 Decem. 1995
15 February 2000
Czech Rep.
October 1993
February 1995
17 January 1996
31 March 1998
Romania
February 1993
February 1995
22 June 1995
15 February 2000
Slovakia
October 1993
February 1995
27 June 1995
15 February 2000
Estonia
June 1995
February 1998
24 Novem. 1995 31 March 1998
Latvia
June 1995
February 1998
13 October1995
15 February 2000
Lithuania
June 1995
February 1998
8 December 1995 15 February 2000
Slovenia
June 1996
February 1998
10 June 1996
31 March 1998
Source:
Table compiled by the author from various
Bulletins of the European Union
issues, external relations sections.
Of these candidates, the European Union seems to have the hardest time in handling the Turkish
application; this is indicated by the fact that Turkey, despite its longest association with the EU and oldest
membership application, is the only country with which accession negotiations are not yet open. An
additional proof for the EU’s hesitancy towards Turkey is provided in the December 2000 Nice summit
when the European Council agreed on a draft of institutional reforms for the EU to prepare for its next
wave of enlargement. In these forecasted institutional reforms, the EU took into consideration all but one
candidate country, Turkey. Similarly, there was some disagreement over the inclusion of Turkey in the
Convention on the Future of Europe, with the European Council initially leaving Turkey out in its
informal Ghent summit of October 2001, despite the European Commission’s recommendation for its
inclusion. The reservations over Turkey’s participation to the Convention were resolved in the Laeken
summit of the Council in December 2001.
EU decision-making with regard to Turkey is interesting to examine in terms of European integration and
enlargement issues. One basic assumption of the paper is that Turkey’s position in the enlargement
process cannot be treated as an independent case on its own, but should be evaluated within the larger
framework of enlargement. In other words, the EU’s reservations, the role of the EU public towards the
process of enlargement, the bargains that will be conducted between member states during enlargement
negotiations for all candidate countries affect Turkey’s position in the enlargement process. This is not to
say that the EU does not have specific reservations and issues that relate only to the Turkish case, but that
the picture is more complicated than a European Union-Turkish bilateral relationship. The factors that
are relevant in this picture are the European Union’s policy making mechanisms, the role of public
opinion, the EU’s institutional set-up and of course the EU member states’ preferences. This approach
therefore differs from previous work on the subject by placing EU-Turkish relations within a multilateral
framework of enlargement in general, rather than a binary relationship.
i
Similarly, I have argued
elsewhere in a work co-authored with Lauren McLaren, that Turkey’s relations with the European Union
should be evaluated within a perspective of the enlargement preferences of EU members and policy
making in the European Union. The assumption in that work was that member states’ preferences
determine the outcome of bargains in the European Union’s policy of enlargement.
ii
This is not to deny that the EU’s enlargement process is guided by objective criteria. The first
requirement to be considered in the enlargement process is to be European. The importance of this
requirement is that no applicant country will be considered
eligible
for membership unless it is deemed
European. It was on this ground that Morocco’s application for full membership to the EU was rejected
outright. As for Turkey, its eligibility for membership is noted by the Commission’s Opinion in 1989 on
the Turkish application as well as the Presidency Conclusions in all European Council summits regarding
enlargement. In addition to being European, there are certain conditions to be fulfilled for membership.
The general framework for the enlargement process is set by the Copenhagen criteria, adopted at the June
1993 European Council Summit in Copenhagen, for candidate countries’ accession negotiations to begin.
The Copenhagen criteria for the EU’s enlargement process are as follows:
•
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and protection of minorities; -these criteria are integrated into the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, adopted in the 2000 Nice summit of the European Council.
•
the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union;
•
the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union, in other words the ability to adopt the EU’s acquis
communautaire.
All candidate countries must satisfy these criteria in order to qualify for membership of the EU and their
progress in meeting these criteria is evaluated by the European Commission on an annual basis since
1998 with its Progress Reports on every candidate. The objectivity of these criteria is best summarised
by the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement, Guenther Verheugen, that “negotiations should
proceed on the basis of merit not on the basis of compassion”.
iii
Turkey, as a candidate country, is
subject to this evaluation in terms of its ability in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria. The Commission
applies a ‘policy of differentiation’ in its negotiations in which every candidate proceeds at its own
speed. Thus a candidate with which accession negotiations were opened in Helsinki may move ahead of a
candidate with whom accession negotiations were opened in Luxembourg- or vice versa -depending on
their progress. In addition, the candidate countries must also ensure the effective implementation of the
reforms enacted under the Copenhagen criteria. In the Madrid summit of the European Council in
December 1995, the European Union made it explicitly clear that the candidates will be evaluated in
terms of their capacities in the successful implementation of Community legislation, specifically in
enforcing the Union’s acquis.
In addition to the problems associated with its meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, there are other unspoken
factors that are arguably obstacles to Turkish membership of the EU.
iv
The first of these is the perceived
cultural differences between Turkey and the EU; presumably resulting from the different religious
background of Turks compared to most other Europeans. Second, with a relatively poor population of
approximately 65 million, there are also concerns of mass migration from Turkey to the EU, the
redistribution of regional development funds, and the allocation of votes and seats in EU institutions such
as the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Parliament. The impact of this concern was
illustrated with the Nice Council’s decision to omit Turkey from the calculations of voting power in an
enlarged Union.
The European Union had a problematic stance with respect to Turkey’s membership in terms of its
inclusion in the enlargement process up to the Helsinki Council of December 1999 when it finally granted
Turkey candidacy status. Turkey’s ability in meeting the Copenhagen criteria did not significantly
improve from Luxembourg summit of December 1997-when it was excluded from the enlargement
process-to the Helsinki summit of December 1999-when it was included as a candidate country. This fact
raises the question that there must be another variable impacting Turkey’s position in the enlargement
process and this paper proposes that this variable is the EU’s institutional set-up. Thus, this paper
proposes that Turkey's relations with the European Union are problematic because of the inherent tensions
in the European Union, the diverging preferences of the EU states and the EU’s institutional set-up. This is
not to deny the importance of Turkey’s shortcomings in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and the EU's
reservations about Turkey’s political and economic conditions. One might consider these as an additional
factor complicating Turkey’s accession to the EU on top of the requirement of fulfilling the basic
conditions for membership.
However, in answering the question as to why Turkey is included in the EU’s enlargement process
despite all the question marks and obstacles, the following quote from Mr. Verheugen, lies at the heart of
the matter: “This decision was made long ago. For decades, Turkey has been told that it has prospects for
becoming a full member. It would have disastrous consequences if we now tell Turkey: actually we did
not mean this at all.”
v
This declaration illustrates that the EU’s institutional credibility would be at stake
if Turkey were excluded from the process of enlargement.
There are three major obstacles to Turkey’s membership to the EU: (i) Turkey’s ability in meeting the
Copenhagen criteria, (ii) the EU’s institutional set-up and the role of the member states’ preferences-
particularly important here is Turkey’s relations with Greece,
vi
and (iii) the European public’s support
for Turkey’s membership to the European Union.
Aside from the general reservations towards enlargement, the EU has specific concerns towards Turkey
in the sense that the EU has explicitly stated that ongoing disputes with a Member State act as an
obstacle to Turkey’s closer integration to the European Union. This means that Turkey’s relations with
Greece is an important factor in determining the nature of its relations with the EU.
The paper will evolve by a brief discussion of Turkey’s history with the EU, an analysis of the role of
Turkish-Greek relations on Turkey’s relations with the EU, the EU’s institutional set-up and the role of
public opinion towards enlargement and towards Turkey’s membership.
Obstacles to Turkey’s Accession to the European Union
Turkey became an Associate member of the EC/EU when it signed the Ankara Treaty/Association
Agreement on September 12, 1963. It has the longest association with the European Union among the
candidate countries. It signed an Additional Protocol in 1970 and a Customs Union Agreement – as
foreseen by the Association Agreement- in 1995. Turkey applied for full membership in the EU in April
1987. In its Opinion of December 18, 1989, the Commission stated that Turkey’s accession is unlikely at
the moment. When the European Union embarked on its process of enlargement in 1997 with the
European Commission’s Agenda 2000, it left Turkey out of this process. In its Luxembourg summit of
December 1997, the European Council decided not to include Turkey among the candidate countries
even though it included all the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Cyprus. In
its Helsinki summit of December 1999, the Council elevated Turkey’s status from an applicant to a
candidate country. The Council decisions integrate Turkey into the Community programs and agencies;
and moreover, allow its participation in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context
of the accession process. On November 8, 2000 the European Commission adopted its Accession
Partnership Document for Turkey which was approved in the General Affairs Council of December 4,
2000 and finally adopted by the Council on March 8, 2001. Turkey adopted its National Programme for
the Adoption of the Acquis on March 19, 2001. Despite these positive developments, as of present,
Turkey is the only candidate country with which accession negotiations have not begun.
To turn to the first factor impacting Turkey’s relations with the EU, the Copenhagen criteria, one should
note that these criteria are not specific to Turkey and that every candidate for EU membership must satisfy
the basic criteria for membership. In terms of its economic development, Turkey demonstrated its
capabilities to deal with the pressures of a market economy far better than the Central and Eastern
European countries, at least prior to its financial crisis of 2001. According to the Commission’s Progress
Report, ”Turkey has many of the characteristics of a market economy. It should be able to cope albeit with
difficulties, with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union”
vii
.
Of course, Turkey has a
lower per capita income than the EU members; it has a staggering inflation rate and a budget deficit; which
are all obstacles to Turkey’s incorporation. According to the 2001 Progress Report, “Turkey has been
unable to make further progress towards achieving a functioning market economy….Turkey has been
implementing an ambitious economic program that addresses….the risks and vulnerabilities of the
domestic financial sector and seeks to reduce government intervention in many areas of the economy.
These problems are at the heart of the crises.”
viii
Thus, it seems Turkey’s success in its new economic
program adopted in March 2001 will also determine its capacity to satisfy the economic aspects of the
Copenhagen criteria. As for the ability to take on the responsibilities of membership, Turkey’s adoption of
Community law and the harmonization of its laws since the Customs Union demonstrate that Turkey
would not have serious problems there. Thus, it is no coincidence that Turkey’s adoption of the acquis is
most advanced in these areas. “Turkey has made substantial preparatory efforts for the implementation of
the Accession Partnership….considerable further efforts are needed to meet the short term Accession
Partnership priorities related to the acquis.”
ix
Although adopting the necessary legislation is not sufficient,
an important component of the adoption of the acquis is the implementation of the harmonised legislation
as foreseen by Madrid Council of December 1995.
Despite the current problems in the Turkish economy and in Turkey’s ability in adopting the acquis, the
most important obstacle to membership is the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria. The Copenhagen
European Council stated that “membership requires that the candidate country achieve stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of
minorities”.
x
According to the Commission Progress Reports of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, Turkey’s
main problem is its adherence to the political conditions of the Copenhagen criteria. The main problems
are structural problems in Turkish democracy, such as the role of the military in civilian politics, respect
for human rights and the Kurdish problem. Thus, when the Helsinki Council decided to elevate Turkey’s
status to a candidate country, it specifically stated that accession negotiations are possible only when
Turkey fulfils the political conditions. “Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other
candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will
include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria
for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights.”
xi
According to the Commission,
“The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as
civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively addressed. Despite a number of constitutional,
legislative and administrative changes, the actual human right situation as it affects individuals in Turkey
needs improvement”.
xii
Turkey has been trying to reform its political system since the second half of the 1980s. For example,
by accepting the authority and jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in 1987, Turkey has
demonstrated its willingness to comply with European standards.
xiii
Thus, even though Turkish
democracy has a number of problems, serious steps are being taken to deal with them, including the
possibility of abolishing death penalty. It seems that full membership of the EU is a powerful incentive
for political change in Turkey. The pre-accession strategy for Turkey, as agreed in Helsinki, is
proceeding along the lines of enhanced political dialogue with three main components: human rights,
border issues and Cyprus. According to the European Union, the human rights issue is where Turkey
must focus its energies in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. On that matter, delegations from the
European Parliament and the Commission frequently visit Turkey. On October 3 2001, the Turkish
Grand National Assembly adopted thirty-four amendments to the 1982 Constitution, which included a
series of political reforms on reforming the death penalty sentence, the usage of ‘mother tongue’,
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zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl upanicza.keep.pl
Introduction
The European Union is engaged in an extensive process of enlargement. The European Council decided
in its Luxembourg summit of December 1997 to open the path for the Union’s enlargement towards the
Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus, upon the European Commission’s proposal in its
Agenda 2000 of July 1997. The Helsinki summit of December 1999 included Turkey and Malta in this
process of enlargement. Currently, there are 13 candidate countries aspiring for full membership of the
EU, an analysis of these countries’ relations with the EU is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Candidate countries and the agreements they signed with the EU
Country
Association
Agreement
Operation of the
Association
Membership
application
Start of Accession
negotiations
Turkey
September 1963 December1964 14 April 1987
----
Cyprus
December 1970 April 1971
3 July 1990
31 March 1998
Malta
December 1972 June 1973
18 July 1990
15 February 2000
Hungary
December 1991 February 1994
31 March 1994
31 March 1998
Poland
December 1991 February 1994
5 April 1994
31 March 1998
Bulgaria
March 1993
February 1995
14 Decem. 1995
15 February 2000
Czech Rep.
October 1993
February 1995
17 January 1996
31 March 1998
Romania
February 1993
February 1995
22 June 1995
15 February 2000
Slovakia
October 1993
February 1995
27 June 1995
15 February 2000
Estonia
June 1995
February 1998
24 Novem. 1995 31 March 1998
Latvia
June 1995
February 1998
13 October1995
15 February 2000
Lithuania
June 1995
February 1998
8 December 1995 15 February 2000
Slovenia
June 1996
February 1998
10 June 1996
31 March 1998
Source:
Table compiled by the author from various
Bulletins of the European Union
issues, external relations sections.
Of these candidates, the European Union seems to have the hardest time in handling the Turkish
application; this is indicated by the fact that Turkey, despite its longest association with the EU and oldest
membership application, is the only country with which accession negotiations are not yet open. An
additional proof for the EU’s hesitancy towards Turkey is provided in the December 2000 Nice summit
when the European Council agreed on a draft of institutional reforms for the EU to prepare for its next
wave of enlargement. In these forecasted institutional reforms, the EU took into consideration all but one
candidate country, Turkey. Similarly, there was some disagreement over the inclusion of Turkey in the
Convention on the Future of Europe, with the European Council initially leaving Turkey out in its
informal Ghent summit of October 2001, despite the European Commission’s recommendation for its
inclusion. The reservations over Turkey’s participation to the Convention were resolved in the Laeken
summit of the Council in December 2001.
EU decision-making with regard to Turkey is interesting to examine in terms of European integration and
enlargement issues. One basic assumption of the paper is that Turkey’s position in the enlargement
process cannot be treated as an independent case on its own, but should be evaluated within the larger
framework of enlargement. In other words, the EU’s reservations, the role of the EU public towards the
process of enlargement, the bargains that will be conducted between member states during enlargement
negotiations for all candidate countries affect Turkey’s position in the enlargement process. This is not to
say that the EU does not have specific reservations and issues that relate only to the Turkish case, but that
the picture is more complicated than a European Union-Turkish bilateral relationship. The factors that
are relevant in this picture are the European Union’s policy making mechanisms, the role of public
opinion, the EU’s institutional set-up and of course the EU member states’ preferences. This approach
therefore differs from previous work on the subject by placing EU-Turkish relations within a multilateral
framework of enlargement in general, rather than a binary relationship.
i
Similarly, I have argued
elsewhere in a work co-authored with Lauren McLaren, that Turkey’s relations with the European Union
should be evaluated within a perspective of the enlargement preferences of EU members and policy
making in the European Union. The assumption in that work was that member states’ preferences
determine the outcome of bargains in the European Union’s policy of enlargement.
ii
This is not to deny that the EU’s enlargement process is guided by objective criteria. The first
requirement to be considered in the enlargement process is to be European. The importance of this
requirement is that no applicant country will be considered
eligible
for membership unless it is deemed
European. It was on this ground that Morocco’s application for full membership to the EU was rejected
outright. As for Turkey, its eligibility for membership is noted by the Commission’s Opinion in 1989 on
the Turkish application as well as the Presidency Conclusions in all European Council summits regarding
enlargement. In addition to being European, there are certain conditions to be fulfilled for membership.
The general framework for the enlargement process is set by the Copenhagen criteria, adopted at the June
1993 European Council Summit in Copenhagen, for candidate countries’ accession negotiations to begin.
The Copenhagen criteria for the EU’s enlargement process are as follows:
•
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and protection of minorities; -these criteria are integrated into the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, adopted in the 2000 Nice summit of the European Council.
•
the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union;
•
the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union, in other words the ability to adopt the EU’s acquis
communautaire.
All candidate countries must satisfy these criteria in order to qualify for membership of the EU and their
progress in meeting these criteria is evaluated by the European Commission on an annual basis since
1998 with its Progress Reports on every candidate. The objectivity of these criteria is best summarised
by the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement, Guenther Verheugen, that “negotiations should
proceed on the basis of merit not on the basis of compassion”.
iii
Turkey, as a candidate country, is
subject to this evaluation in terms of its ability in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria. The Commission
applies a ‘policy of differentiation’ in its negotiations in which every candidate proceeds at its own
speed. Thus a candidate with which accession negotiations were opened in Helsinki may move ahead of a
candidate with whom accession negotiations were opened in Luxembourg- or vice versa -depending on
their progress. In addition, the candidate countries must also ensure the effective implementation of the
reforms enacted under the Copenhagen criteria. In the Madrid summit of the European Council in
December 1995, the European Union made it explicitly clear that the candidates will be evaluated in
terms of their capacities in the successful implementation of Community legislation, specifically in
enforcing the Union’s acquis.
In addition to the problems associated with its meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, there are other unspoken
factors that are arguably obstacles to Turkish membership of the EU.
iv
The first of these is the perceived
cultural differences between Turkey and the EU; presumably resulting from the different religious
background of Turks compared to most other Europeans. Second, with a relatively poor population of
approximately 65 million, there are also concerns of mass migration from Turkey to the EU, the
redistribution of regional development funds, and the allocation of votes and seats in EU institutions such
as the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Parliament. The impact of this concern was
illustrated with the Nice Council’s decision to omit Turkey from the calculations of voting power in an
enlarged Union.
The European Union had a problematic stance with respect to Turkey’s membership in terms of its
inclusion in the enlargement process up to the Helsinki Council of December 1999 when it finally granted
Turkey candidacy status. Turkey’s ability in meeting the Copenhagen criteria did not significantly
improve from Luxembourg summit of December 1997-when it was excluded from the enlargement
process-to the Helsinki summit of December 1999-when it was included as a candidate country. This fact
raises the question that there must be another variable impacting Turkey’s position in the enlargement
process and this paper proposes that this variable is the EU’s institutional set-up. Thus, this paper
proposes that Turkey's relations with the European Union are problematic because of the inherent tensions
in the European Union, the diverging preferences of the EU states and the EU’s institutional set-up. This is
not to deny the importance of Turkey’s shortcomings in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and the EU's
reservations about Turkey’s political and economic conditions. One might consider these as an additional
factor complicating Turkey’s accession to the EU on top of the requirement of fulfilling the basic
conditions for membership.
However, in answering the question as to why Turkey is included in the EU’s enlargement process
despite all the question marks and obstacles, the following quote from Mr. Verheugen, lies at the heart of
the matter: “This decision was made long ago. For decades, Turkey has been told that it has prospects for
becoming a full member. It would have disastrous consequences if we now tell Turkey: actually we did
not mean this at all.”
v
This declaration illustrates that the EU’s institutional credibility would be at stake
if Turkey were excluded from the process of enlargement.
There are three major obstacles to Turkey’s membership to the EU: (i) Turkey’s ability in meeting the
Copenhagen criteria, (ii) the EU’s institutional set-up and the role of the member states’ preferences-
particularly important here is Turkey’s relations with Greece,
vi
and (iii) the European public’s support
for Turkey’s membership to the European Union.
Aside from the general reservations towards enlargement, the EU has specific concerns towards Turkey
in the sense that the EU has explicitly stated that ongoing disputes with a Member State act as an
obstacle to Turkey’s closer integration to the European Union. This means that Turkey’s relations with
Greece is an important factor in determining the nature of its relations with the EU.
The paper will evolve by a brief discussion of Turkey’s history with the EU, an analysis of the role of
Turkish-Greek relations on Turkey’s relations with the EU, the EU’s institutional set-up and the role of
public opinion towards enlargement and towards Turkey’s membership.
Obstacles to Turkey’s Accession to the European Union
Turkey became an Associate member of the EC/EU when it signed the Ankara Treaty/Association
Agreement on September 12, 1963. It has the longest association with the European Union among the
candidate countries. It signed an Additional Protocol in 1970 and a Customs Union Agreement – as
foreseen by the Association Agreement- in 1995. Turkey applied for full membership in the EU in April
1987. In its Opinion of December 18, 1989, the Commission stated that Turkey’s accession is unlikely at
the moment. When the European Union embarked on its process of enlargement in 1997 with the
European Commission’s Agenda 2000, it left Turkey out of this process. In its Luxembourg summit of
December 1997, the European Council decided not to include Turkey among the candidate countries
even though it included all the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Cyprus. In
its Helsinki summit of December 1999, the Council elevated Turkey’s status from an applicant to a
candidate country. The Council decisions integrate Turkey into the Community programs and agencies;
and moreover, allow its participation in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context
of the accession process. On November 8, 2000 the European Commission adopted its Accession
Partnership Document for Turkey which was approved in the General Affairs Council of December 4,
2000 and finally adopted by the Council on March 8, 2001. Turkey adopted its National Programme for
the Adoption of the Acquis on March 19, 2001. Despite these positive developments, as of present,
Turkey is the only candidate country with which accession negotiations have not begun.
To turn to the first factor impacting Turkey’s relations with the EU, the Copenhagen criteria, one should
note that these criteria are not specific to Turkey and that every candidate for EU membership must satisfy
the basic criteria for membership. In terms of its economic development, Turkey demonstrated its
capabilities to deal with the pressures of a market economy far better than the Central and Eastern
European countries, at least prior to its financial crisis of 2001. According to the Commission’s Progress
Report, ”Turkey has many of the characteristics of a market economy. It should be able to cope albeit with
difficulties, with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union”
vii
.
Of course, Turkey has a
lower per capita income than the EU members; it has a staggering inflation rate and a budget deficit; which
are all obstacles to Turkey’s incorporation. According to the 2001 Progress Report, “Turkey has been
unable to make further progress towards achieving a functioning market economy….Turkey has been
implementing an ambitious economic program that addresses….the risks and vulnerabilities of the
domestic financial sector and seeks to reduce government intervention in many areas of the economy.
These problems are at the heart of the crises.”
viii
Thus, it seems Turkey’s success in its new economic
program adopted in March 2001 will also determine its capacity to satisfy the economic aspects of the
Copenhagen criteria. As for the ability to take on the responsibilities of membership, Turkey’s adoption of
Community law and the harmonization of its laws since the Customs Union demonstrate that Turkey
would not have serious problems there. Thus, it is no coincidence that Turkey’s adoption of the acquis is
most advanced in these areas. “Turkey has made substantial preparatory efforts for the implementation of
the Accession Partnership….considerable further efforts are needed to meet the short term Accession
Partnership priorities related to the acquis.”
ix
Although adopting the necessary legislation is not sufficient,
an important component of the adoption of the acquis is the implementation of the harmonised legislation
as foreseen by Madrid Council of December 1995.
Despite the current problems in the Turkish economy and in Turkey’s ability in adopting the acquis, the
most important obstacle to membership is the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria. The Copenhagen
European Council stated that “membership requires that the candidate country achieve stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of
minorities”.
x
According to the Commission Progress Reports of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, Turkey’s
main problem is its adherence to the political conditions of the Copenhagen criteria. The main problems
are structural problems in Turkish democracy, such as the role of the military in civilian politics, respect
for human rights and the Kurdish problem. Thus, when the Helsinki Council decided to elevate Turkey’s
status to a candidate country, it specifically stated that accession negotiations are possible only when
Turkey fulfils the political conditions. “Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other
candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will
include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria
for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights.”
xi
According to the Commission,
“The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as
civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively addressed. Despite a number of constitutional,
legislative and administrative changes, the actual human right situation as it affects individuals in Turkey
needs improvement”.
xii
Turkey has been trying to reform its political system since the second half of the 1980s. For example,
by accepting the authority and jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in 1987, Turkey has
demonstrated its willingness to comply with European standards.
xiii
Thus, even though Turkish
democracy has a number of problems, serious steps are being taken to deal with them, including the
possibility of abolishing death penalty. It seems that full membership of the EU is a powerful incentive
for political change in Turkey. The pre-accession strategy for Turkey, as agreed in Helsinki, is
proceeding along the lines of enhanced political dialogue with three main components: human rights,
border issues and Cyprus. According to the European Union, the human rights issue is where Turkey
must focus its energies in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. On that matter, delegations from the
European Parliament and the Commission frequently visit Turkey. On October 3 2001, the Turkish
Grand National Assembly adopted thirty-four amendments to the 1982 Constitution, which included a
series of political reforms on reforming the death penalty sentence, the usage of ‘mother tongue’,
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]